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INTRODUCTION 
Julius Henry Cohen was a man concerned with the social good.  He 
understood law to have a place in our thinking about that subject.  He 
also understood the professional practice associated with it to be an 
activity different in kind from the practice of commerce.  Given these 
dispositions, Cohen was quite naturally concerned about the growing 
influence of commercialism on the practice of law in his time, namely 
early twentieth century industrial America.  Accordingly, Cohen 
expressed his reservations in his 1916 publication The Law: Business 
or Profession?,1 the purpose of which was to challenge the 
commercialization of the practice of law and, correspondingly, to 
defend a vision of lawyering as a profession.2 
 
∗ Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.  A.B. 1989, Stanford 
University; J.D. 1994, Yale Law School.  I would like to thank Jenny Roberts and 
David Driesen for comments on the draft of this paper.  I would also like to thank the 
participants in the conference “The Law: Business or Profession?  The Continuing 
Relevance of Julius Henry Cohen for the Practice of Law in the Twenty-First 
Century,” including William Nelson and David Luban who served as commentators 
on the draft paper, for their remarks.  Finally, I thank Kathryn J. Cooperman for her 
research assistance.  © 2012 Rakesh K. Anand.  All rights reserved. 
 1. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? (1916) 
 2. For a discussion of Cohen’s vision, see Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius 
Henry Cohen and the Origins of the Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the 
Discourse of Early Twentieth Century Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
1 (2005). 
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For me, Cohen’s work remains relevant principally because I share 
his starting points in my thinking about law and its professional 
practice today.  I, too, am concerned with the social good.  
Additionally, I understand law to speak to that subject and consider 
the practice of law to be a pursuit that is qualitatively distinct from 
the practice of commerce.  And, in this light, the present increasing 
sway of commercialism over the practice of law likewise disturbs me.  
Unlike Cohen, however, my apprehension about the rising impact of 
commercialism on lawyering does not lead me to address the 
business/profession dichotomy—at least not directly.  Rather, my 
worry about commercialism’s mounting influence on the practice of 
law points me in a different direction.  Specifically, it leads me to 
attend to a broad social issue: commercialism’s growing impact on 
society as a whole and how we might think about law and the role for 
lawyers in light of this state of affairs.  For me, this matter is the 
context within which to explore the proper relationship between 
commercialism and the practice of law because it is, in my opinion, a 
more pressing social concern than the subject of the practice of law’s 
character as a profession and its beneficial role, as such, in a 
democracy.  Accordingly, in this Essay, I depart from Cohen’s 
principal focus and take up this broad social issue. 
Importantly, in doing so, I proceed from a distinct perspective on 
the essential character of commercialism and law.  Specifically, I 
understand each to be a cultural practice of a set of ideas and, as such, 
to be a way of knowing, or being in, the world, at least in the United 
States.  To speak in a slightly more technical vocabulary, I understand 
each to be, for Americans, a “cultural form” of enterprise—a cultural 
activity that affords an entry point into that which surrounds the 
individual, a means in and through which he or she organizes and 
comprehends experience—and to be aptly categorized alongside 
other cultural forms that Americans engage, for example religion, 
science, and art.3  Necessarily, this disposition toward the essential 
 
 3. For a discussion of religious practice as a cultural enterprise, see generally 
PETER BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF 
RELIGION (1967).  For a discussion of art as a cultural enterprise, see ERNST 
CASSIRER, AN ESSAY ON MAN: AN INTRODUCTION TO A PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN 
CULTURE 137–70 (1944).  The intellectual history of physics suggests its nature as a 
cultural enterprise.  For a treatment of this history, see generally ALBERT EINSTEIN & 
LEOPOLD INFELD, THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS (1938).  Today, string theory (perhaps 
more specifically M-theory) offers a new alternative to both relativity theory and 
standard quantum theory.  For an introduction to string theory, see BRIAN GREENE, 
THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE: SUPERSTRINGS, HIDDEN DIMENSIONS, AND THE QUEST FOR 
THE ULTIMATE THEORY (1999).  It is perhaps necessary to state that characterizing 
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character of commercialism and law informs my approach to the 
question presented.  For me, the subject to be addressed is the 
growing influence of the cultural form of commercialism on society as 
a whole—or, more precisely, the growing influence of the cultural 
form of economics,4 commercialism being the practice of a set of 
economic ideas5—and how we might think about the cultural form of 
law and the role for its most representative figures in light of this state 
of affairs.  The discourse that follows reflects this orientation toward 
the subject matter (which is, to be precise, a philosophical-
anthropological one).6 
 
science as a cultural practice is not a denial of scientific observation.  It is only a 
statement that a difference exists between scientific observation and the meaning that 
we ascribe to such observation. 
 4. The references to economics throughout this Essay pertain to neo-classical 
economics.  Both capitalist and non-capitalist alternatives to neo-classical economic 
theory exist.  Capitalist approaches to the economic order that are not neo-classical 
in form include traditional institutionalist economics.  For an introduction to 
institutional economic theory, see, e.g., GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, What Is the 
Essence of Institutional Economics, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS: AN 
ANTHOLOGY 399 (David M. Hausman ed., 3d ed. 2008) and Walter H. Hamilton, The 
Institutional Approach to Economic Theory, 9 AM. ECON. REV. (SUPPLEMENT) 309–
18 (1919). See also JOHN R. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS PLACE IN 
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1934); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE 
CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS (1899).  Non-capitalist approaches to 
economic production include those grounded in a Marxist ideology, as well as those 
rooted in the ideology of Gross National Happiness.  For an introduction to the 
former, see THE MARX-ENGELS READER (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).  For an 
introduction to the latter, see Mark Mancall, Gross National Happiness and 
Development: An Essay, in GROSS NATIONAL HAPPINESS AND DEVELOPMENT: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF GROSS NATIONAL HAPPINESS 1 (Karma Ura & Karma 
Galay eds., 2004). 
 5. Cf. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 7–8 (Cosimo 
Classics 2005) (1904) (describing the business enterprise as the “directing force” that 
animates the modern industrial system and the modern industrial system as the 
“material framework of modern civilization”). 
 6. Economists themselves acknowledge that economics is a way of approaching 
the individual and the larger reality within which he or she operates. See, e.g., GARY 
S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3 (1976).  For an 
interesting discussion that acknowledges economics as “a way of looking at the 
world,” but resists defining it as a form of knowledge, see RONALD H. COASE, 
Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, in ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 
34 (1994).  At the same time, however, economists do not necessarily acknowledge 
that economics is an ordering of things that individuals internalize, at least in the 
United States.  In fact, neo-classical economic theorists claim a focus on 
predictability, as opposed to descriptive accuracy.  They also disclaim a normative 
dimension to their analysis.  For the most well-known statement, and defense, of neo-
classical economics’ predictive orientation, see MILTON FRIEDMAN, The 
Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3 (1953).  
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In summary form, the discourse makes three points.  It explains 
that (a) illustrative of the social concern that motivates this Essay, the 
cultural form of economics occupies a significant place in the 
American political order, one that has a pronounced, negative effect 
on society;7 (b) the cultural form of law offers the hope of an 
alternative mode of being in and through which to engage political 
life, one that provides for a more healthy social condition and, 
correspondingly, a space in and through which to resist the cultural 
form of economics and its negative social effects; and (c) the role for 
the lawyer in America today is to help realize the promise of the 
cultural form of law and, correspondingly, push against the 
manifestation of the cultural form of economics and its detrimental 
social consequences.  As this summary description indicates, the 
broad message of the discourse is that cause for concern exists—the 
American embrace of the cultural form of economics has put the 
political order in a bad place and, thus, the social situation is a 
troubled one—and the cultural form of law and the legal profession 
represent a locus within which to assist society in moving in the 
direction of change. 
Quite naturally, this broad message speaks to my purpose in 
presenting the discourse.  In a small way, I hope to help increase 
awareness in American society of the problems resident in its politics 
and to identify one space within which Americans can begin to 
address them.  Ernst Cassirer argued that philosophy must ultimately 
relate itself to the world and, correspondingly, that it had an ethical 
task—loosely speaking, to guide humanity and make man aware of 
the social problems of his time.8  Karl Marx offered a variation on this 
thesis when he famously stated that the point of philosophy is to 
 
For an important response, see Ronald H. Coase, How Should Economists Choose?, 
in COASE, supra, at 15. 
On law in America as a cultural practice, see PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY 
OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999) and Paul W. Kahn, 
Freedom, Autonomy, and the Cultural Study of Law, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 141 
(2001). 
 7. For a recent discussion of economic psychology and contemporary American 
society, one with points of contact with this essay, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT 
MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012). 
 8. ERNST CASSIRER, The Concept of Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem, in 
SYMBOL, MYTH, AND CULTURE: ESSAYS AND LECTURES OF ERNST CASSIRER 1935–
1945, at 49–63 (Donald Phillip Verene ed., 1979); see also, Donald Phillip Verene, 
Introduction to THORA ILIN BAYER, CASSIRER’S METAPHYSICS OF SYMBOLIC FORMS 
28–37 (2001) (describing the normative dimension of Cassirer’s Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms).  
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change the world.9  I present my observations in the spirit of these 
thoughts. 
Before proceeding with the discussion, a few brief comments are 
necessary to ensure the clarity of my remarks—to make plain what I 
am and am not saying.  First, my concern with, and reflection on, the 
rise of the cultural form of economics in American society is an 
apprehension over, and consideration of, the increased dominance of 
a market psychology in the extant political order of America.  That is, 
the impetus for the discourse, and the object of inquiry, is a growing 
social disposition and associated pattern of behavior in the United 
States.  It is not instrumental institutions, namely markets, per se.  
Markets themselves, and specifically the questions of whether they 
have a place in the political order and, if so, the extent to which they 
do, are not subjects that I take up.  Nothing in this Essay is intended 
to suggest otherwise. 
Second, my focus on the growing influence of the cultural form of 
economics in America today ultimately reflects the identification of 
one important factor contributing to a negative social condition.  
Arguably, it is the most significant factor, particularly at the broad 
level at which I direct my attention.  It is not, however, the only one.  
Other elements of social life negatively impact contemporary 
America’s politics.  For example, while advancements in technology 
have greatly improved social life in many respects, they also have 
their deleterious effects.  Nothing that follows should be read as a 
denial of the existence of such other forces. 
Third, the discussion that follows reflects a consideration of the 
present social circumstance and the opportunity associated with the 
cultural practice of law.  It does not speak to how we might think 
about the other cultural practices that Americans take up—whether 
those that speak to the political sphere of experience or otherwise—
and the role for their most representative figures with respect to this 
same phenomenon.  In this way, the discourse is narrowly drawn and 
engages one slice—the slice about which it makes sense for me to 
speak—of an ultimately broad question.  Necessarily, that broad 
question is left aside.10 
 
 9. Karl Marx, Theses on Fuerbach, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 145 (Robert 
C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). 
 10. A final comment about my remarks speaks to its historical character.  As is 
commonly recognized, today we live in an age where the modern form of politics, 
namely that of the nation-state, confronts a post-modern form of politics, namely that 
of globalization.  And, as others have also noted, the United States remains tied to 
the former and, in a significant manner, resists the embrace of the latter.  
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I.  THE CULTURAL FORM OF ECONOMICS AND AMERICAN 
SOCIETY TODAY 
The starting point of the discourse is the influence that the cultural 
form of economics has on contemporary American society—the place 
that the cultural form of economics occupies in American political 
space.  And that discussion begins with an explication of the cultural 
form itself.  The first step in comprehending the present relationship 
of the economic way of life to the American political order is 
understanding what the economic manner of living looks like and, in 
light of the motivating concerns of this Essay, what the central 
pathologies associated with the form of being are.  Only if we have a 
picture of what it means to experience the world “economically,” one 
that reveals the way of life’s main unhealthy features, can we grasp 
the hold that the cultural form of economics has on America today.  
At its core, the cultural form of economics is organized around four 
ideas.  Taken together, these ideas provide the requisite insights. 
The first idea reflects the metaphysical orientation of the cultural 
form of economics and is, accordingly, the true starting point of the 
economic way of life.  That idea is the sovereignty of the market.  For 
the economic way of being, the market reigns.  It possesses a 
transcendental character and, correspondingly, stands as a sort of lord 
over the world.11  The market has existential primacy and is that 
 
Understanding law in the United States as a cultural form and denoting the hope it 
can afford America today is consistent with the present state of America’s politics.  It 
is an account of law in a political community that is still committed to the nation-state 
model of individual and collective governance.  To the extent that this circumstance 
changes—that is, to the extent that the American political community fundamentally 
embraces a more global model of politics—the discourse on law presented here will 
decrease in relevance.   
To be clear, in the event that such a turn in American politics occurs, the concern 
with the cultural form of economics will remain.  Projecting the cultural form of 
economics across populations is central to the neo-liberal project.  Similarly, the 
question of how to think about law in light of the cultural form’s influence on society 
will presumably maintain its currency.  If history is any indication, law will have a 
strong hold on the Western political imagination in the years to come.  The 
conception of law that will inform our discourse, however, will not be that of a 
cultural form (at least as presently constituted).  Necessarily, it will be something 
else.  What that alternate conception of law will—or at least should—be is unclear.  
Indeed, in consideration of such a possible political future, we might begin to ask 
“What should the law become?”  For an introduction to historical conceptions of law, 
see CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. 1963). 
 11. For a reference to the transcendental character of the market, see Mancall, 
supra note 4, at 19. Cf. Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto in THE MARX-ENGELS 
READER 485 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (“In bourgeois society, capital is 
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which ultimately orders things.  In the economic way of life, the 
“invisible hand” of the market governs, providing direction and 
stability to human behavior. 
In exercising its sovereignty, the market rules in a particular 
manner.  Specifically, the market is a “pricing mechanism” that 
establishes a value—a “market value”—for the objects of individual 
interest.  Market governance occurs in and through this pricing 
mechanism, coordinating the satisfaction of interests.12  The sovereign 
character of the market, coupled with this specific character of its 
governance, points to the second idea that lies at the heart of the 
cultural form of economics, one that stands as a corollary to the 
market’s existential preeminence.  For the economic mode of being, 
the sovereign market’s orientation toward the satisfaction of interests 
means that interests have ontological integrity.  They exist in and of 
themselves and have their own essence.  For the economic way of life, 
they are “things-in-themselves.”13 
In a world in which the market reigns and interests are 
correspondingly reified, we should expect an understanding of self 
and other to be constructed in a manner that aligns with these initial 
dispositions.  In the cultural form of economics, they are.  The 
concepts of self and other resident in the economic way of life reflect 
its market and interest-centered orientation.  Not surprisingly, these 
concepts are also basic to the cultural form of economics.  They 
represent the third and fourth foundational ideas. 
With respect to the understanding of the self, for the economic 
mode of living, the individual is the space within which interests 
manifest themselves.  That is, the individual is a matrix of interests.  
More precisely, he or she is a locus of calculation for the satisfaction 
of interests.  For the economic form of being, the individual is a 
computational mechanism that operates to fulfill desires as much as 
possible.  In the technical vocabulary of the cultural form, he or she is 
a “decision unit”14 that “maximizes” the realization of wants (a 
 
independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has no 
individuality.”). 
 12. Technically, there is a limiting circumstance of market rule, which is market 
failure.  In this situation, the government or the firm takes the place of the market as 
the mechanism for coordinating behavior.  On the firm as an alternative to the 
market, see RONALD H. COASE, The Nature of the Firm, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET 
AND THE LAW 33 (1988). 
 13. My intention is not to suggest a direct connection with the Kantian use of the 
term “thing-in-itself.”  For the relevant text of Kant, see IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE 
OF PURE REASON (F. Max Müller trans., Anchor Books 1966) (1781).  
 14. Becker, supra note 6, at 7. 
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process that occurs “rationally” through the assessment of 
“opportunity costs,” the engagement of “cost-benefit analyses,” and 
the taking up of “efficient” action, among other things). 
Reciprocally, if the individual is a locus of calculation for the 
satisfaction of interests, then he or she will apprehend the other in 
terms of its desirability.  This fact suggests the understanding of the 
other to which the cultural form of economics adheres.  For the 
economic way of life, everything that the individual encounters in the 
world is an object of interest.  All are “goods”15—items for 
consumption. 
The understanding of the cultural form of economics that emerges 
from the description of its organizing ideas is that of a market-
governed and interest-based mode of being in which self and other 
are conceptualized in terms of its overarching interest basis.  And, 
with this portrait of the cultural form of economics in hand, we can 
reflect on its essential character and ask what it is that we see.  
Almost immediately, a problem with the cultural form presents itself, 
a problem that points to a true disturbance of being: the way of life 
subscribes to an understanding of self and other that lies outside the 
bounds of any legitimate interpretation.  That is, it sees self and other 
in a manner that does not comport with human reason.  As indicated, 
the economic mode of living approaches the self in computational 
terms oriented around personal desire and the other in the 
vocabulary of self-utilization.  Yet, neither of these conceptualizations 
is sensible.  At his or her core, the individual is not a locus of 
calculation for the satisfaction of interests.  Equally, most things are 
not primarily objects of interest, at least not typically.  Self and other 
may look differently to different people, both within and across time.  
Self and other appear, and have appeared, in a variety of ways.  But it 
is a mistake in thought to comprehend each in the market- and 
interest-oriented manner that the cultural form of economics adopts.16 
 
 15. The term often used in economic circles is “resource,” with academic concern 
focused on “scarce resources.”  For a simple discussion of scarce resources, see 
DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1–2 
(2005).  
 16. On this point, one can consider the words of former Brazilian Secretary of the 
Environment Jose Lutzenberger in reply to former World Bank Chief Economist 
Larry Summers’s famous statement that “the economic logic behind dumping a load 
of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable.”  In a letter to Summers, 
Lutzenberger wrote, in pertinent part: “Your reasoning is perfectly logical but totally 
insane . . . .  Your thoughts [provide] a concrete example of the unbelievable 
alienation, reductionist thinking, social ruthlessness and the arrogant ignorance of 
many conventional ‘economists’ concerning the nature of the world we live in.”  For 
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Two genuine pathologies of the soul follow from this mistake in 
thought.  Preliminarily, the mistake in thought leads to a basic 
misunderstanding of the world as well as of how to think about it and, 
accordingly, gives rise to an uneducated life.  In understanding self 
and other as, respectively, a locus of calculation for the satisfaction of 
interest and an item for consumption, the cultural form of economics 
builds a relationship to reality that is, at its heart, distorted.  It 
constructs a false sense of the world, one that in turn inhibits the 
individual’s ability to engage in productive reflection on that which 
surrounds him or her.  He or she lacks an elementary comprehension 
of things, as well as the tools by which to usefully meditate on them.  
And this state of affairs effects an ignorant existence—a life that is 
unschooled.17 
More deeply, the mistake in thought denies any substantive 
character to the individual self and the other and, thus, precludes the 
possibility of a life with meaningful relations.  In understanding self 
and other as, again, a locus of calculation for the satisfaction of 
interest and an item for consumption, the cultural form of economics 
makes sense of each in wholly secondary terms.  It does not recognize 
either as having its own integrity, at least not substantively.  It sees 
each strictly as an epiphenomenon—an expression of something else, 
namely interests and its concerns.  This approach to self and other, a 
denial of self and other qua self and other, means that in the world of 
economics there is no self and no other.  And this state of affairs in 
turn precludes the realization of a life with meaningful relations, as 
the possibility of such a life presupposes both self and other—
meaningful relations in life always manifesting themselves in a 
movement beyond the former to the latter.18 
The first step in understanding the influence that the cultural form 
of economics has on contemporary American society is the 
explication of the cultural form itself.  The next step is an account of 
its actual manifestation.  It is the expression of the cultural form of 
 
Summers’s famous statement, see Let Them Eat Pollution, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8–14, 
1992, at 66 (reprinting memo of then-World Bank Chief Economist Larry Summers).  
For Lutzenberger’s response, see FRANK ACKERMAN, POISONED FOR PENNIES: THE 
ECONOMICS OF TOXICS AND PRECAUTION 21 (2008).  
 17. In using the terms “uneducated” and “unschooled,” my intention is not to 
patronize.  My hope is that the reader can move past this connotation and take up the 
vocabulary on its own terms.  Additionally, I understand the term “educated” to 
reflect at least two characteristics: that one has learned how to understand and think 
about the world, and that one has a certain moral education.   
 18. There is a limit on the types of others with whom or which we can connect 
(but they are not limited to human or even sentient beings). 
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economics in political space that is the measure of the place it 
occupies in American society and thus, that which ultimately allows 
us to comprehend its hold on America today.  To what extent, then, 
do Americans take up the cultural form of economics?  
Correspondingly, to what degree do its central pathologies realize 
themselves? 
In America today, the degree of engagement with the economic 
mode of being is significant.  That is, Americans embrace the cultural 
form of economics in a wide variety of areas of political life.  In turn, 
the principal unhealthy features of the cultural form of economics are 
appreciably manifest.  A brief description of some of the areas of 
political life in which Americans embrace the cultural form of 
economics provides a general sense of the depth of engagement.  In 
parallel, a short account of the associated pathological expression 
provides a basic appreciation of the extent to which the main 
unhealthy features of the cultural form of economics present 
themselves. 
To begin, an initial space in which Americans bring to bear the 
economic mode of being is their relationship to nature.  To a rather 
significant extent, Americans understand a market—in which they 
appropriate objects for consumption—to be in place in, and to 
govern, this area of political life.  Indeed, Americans’ ordering of this 
dimension of political living is often organized in conjunction with 
just this disposition.  An understanding of the environment as a 
resource and a commitment to market coordination of its utilization 
strongly influences consideration of environmental policy.19  A similar 
situation obtains with respect to the American orientation toward 
non-human sentient beings (one that, accordingly, does not recognize 
a dignity about such beings).20 
Moving on from their relationship to nature, Americans embrace 
the economic way of life in their approach to one another.  In a fairly 
robust way, Americans again recognize a market—in which they 
acquire their object of interest—to order this dimension of political 
living.  Their conceptualization of the relations makes this fact clear.  
At a general level, Americans engage in “relationships” with one 
 
 19. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING 
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); see also David M. 
Dreisen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s Shotgun Wedding: 
Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND. L.J. 21 (2008) (describing the 
significance of “market liberalism” to environmental policy, nationally and globally). 
 20. See, e.g, PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: THE DEFINITIVE CLASSIC OF 
THE ANIMAL MOVEMENT 95–157 (Harper Collins Publishers 2009) (1975). 
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another.  Meanwhile, in the more specific context of their romantic 
pursuits, Americans participate in a “dating market” and enter into 
marriages that are modeled on a contract for services.21 
In line with this approach to one another, Americans also take up, 
or at least are beginning to take up, the economic mode of being in 
their thinking about the constituent elements of the body.  In a 
noticeable manner, Americans reflect on the propriety of a market 
ordering of this aspect of political life, as relatively recent actions 
demonstrate.  In 2003, Congress held hearings on a market-based 
approach to the exchange of bodily organs.22  Consistent with this 
legislative activity, academic scholarship is now exploring this 
subject.23 
Turning in a different direction, Americans further take up the 
economic manner of living in their interactions with social 
institutions.  Increasingly, Americans yet again understand a 
market—in which they obtain their items of interest—to govern this 
aspect of political life.  And, importantly, the relevant range of social 
institutions is not small.  More and more, Americans approach the 
press, the medical establishment, universities, even the military to an 
extent, in market terms, considering each to be a provider of a 
consumer good—and, in turn, each understands itself, and operates, 
as a commercial enterprise.24  For example, the press is organized 
around “what sells” to the consumer25 and news bureaus are 
approached as profit-centers.26 
Finally, looking along a slightly more broad axis, Americans 
engage the economic way of life in their approach to the community 
 
 21. See, e.g., The Dating Market, ECONOMIST (Mar. 2, 2007), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2007/03/the_dating_market; Katherine 
Bindley, Banker Seeks Beauty: Must Be Upbeat Like the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 7, 2009. 
 22. Assessing Initiatives to Increase Organ Donation: Hearing Before the H. 
Subcom. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
108th Cong. 51–57, 64–67 (2003) (statements of Rich DeVos, Dr. Robert Sade, and 
Dr. Francis Delmonico). 
 23. For a reading that explores, in part, a market-based approach to kidney 
exchange, see WHEN ALTRUISM ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR COMPENSATING 
KIDNEY DONORS (Sally Satel ed., 2008). 
 24. See, e.g., TOM FENTON, BAD NEWS: THE DECLINE OF REPORTING, THE 
BUSINESS OF NEWS, AND THE DANGER TO US ALL (2005); DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES 
IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2004); 
James Glanz, Contractors Outnumber U.S. Troops in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
2, 2009, at A10. 
 25. See, e.g., FENTON, supra note 24, at 4.  
 26. See, e.g., id. at 54–57. 
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generally.  In an increasingly pronounced manner, Americans project 
market rule—the pursuit of self-interest—on such affairs.  Their 
behavior in regard to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is perhaps 
most illustrative of this circumstance.  With respect to each war, many 
did not live, or are not living, the conflict.27 
Corresponding to the embrace of the cultural form of economics in 
each of these areas of political life is the coincident manifestation of 
the mode of being’s central pathologies of the soul.  With respect to 
the initial pathology—the problematic disposition toward that which 
surrounds the individual and the ignorant existence it effects—in each 
instance of engagement, the accompanying adoption of the economic 
understanding of self and other—in context, the self qua choice-
making appropriator of nature, other persons, the constituent 
elements of the body, social institutions and the community generally, 
and the associated other as commodity—translates into a basic 
misunderstanding about the world as well as of how to think about it 
and, accordingly, to an uneducated existence.  As the earlier analysis 
would lead one to expect, fairly considered, none of these 
conceptualizations is compelling.  Self and other are not any of these 
things, at least for the most part.  To see them in these ways is to 
embrace a mistake in thought, one that expresses a fundamental 
confusion about the nature of things, a lack of an ability to 
productively reflect on the world, and, ultimately, the maintenance of 
an unschooled life. 
With respect to the deeper pathology—the lack of 
acknowledgement of the substantive character of self and other and, 
consequently, the prevention of the opportunity for an existence with 
meaningful relations—the adoption of the economic mode of being’s 
understanding of self and other—again, in context, the self qua 
choice-making appropriator of nature, other persons, the constituent 
elements of the body, social institutions and the community generally, 
and the associated other as commodity—does deny self and other qua 
self and other and, thus, does preclude the possibility of such a life, at 
least in these dimensions of living.  Stated directly, to see self and 
other in these fashions—to embrace this mistake in thought—is to 
reject the integrity of each and, accordingly, to foreclose the 
opportunity to move beyond the self and connect with the other, as 
 
 27. See, e.g., John Nagl, Op-Ed, Does Military Service Still Matter for the 
Presidency?, WASH. POST, May 25, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/does-military-service-still-matter-for-the-presidency/2012/05/25/ 
gJQAAAMupU_story.html.   
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the various courses of conduct that Americans pursue in these 
contexts suggest.28 
Importantly, in manifesting themselves, each of these pathologies 
has distinct social consequences.  That is, incident to their realization 
are discrete effects on the daily life of society.  Practicing an 
uneducated life and practicing one insulated from relations with 
meaning inevitably impacts the basic functioning of the political 
order, an impact worth noting to fully capture the social condition to 
which the American engagement of the cultural form of economics 
gives rise and, thus, the hold that the economic mode of being has on 
America today.  Among other things, the above referenced American 
ignorance about the world engenders, or at least strongly helps to 
engender, environmental destruction,29 inhumane treatment of 
animals,30 a lack of interpersonal commitment, social institutions of 
declining quality,31 and a decreased sense of community.32  
Meanwhile, the related inability to lead a life with meaningful 
relations results in, or at least significantly contributes to, a lack of a 
practice of love and correspondingly, a disenchanted and unhappy 
citizenry.33 
The combined analysis of the cultural form of economics and its 
extant social expression affords an understanding of the place that the 
cultural form of economics occupies in contemporary America.  With 
this understanding—that the cultural form of economics has a 
significant presence in, and a pronounced, negative effect on, 
society—a conclusion about the present social situation follows.  It is 
not a healthy one and is far from being progressive in the 
Enlightenment sense of the term.  Indeed, it looks more like social 
decay.  Against the backdrop of this reality, we can turn to the latter 
 
 28. The notion of connecting with the other in the above-specified dimensions of 
living requires the qualification of “where possible.”  As noted in an earlier footnote, 
there is a limit on the types of others with whom or which we can connect (but they 
are not limited to human or even sentient beings). See supra note 8. 
 29. The fact of climate change is one example.  For some readings on this subject, 
readings that more specifically explore the intersection of economic thought and U.S. 
climate change policy, see ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 
(David M. Driesen ed., 2010). 
 30. See SINGER, supra note 20. 
 31. See FENTON, supra note 24. 
 32. See Nagl, supra note 27. 
 33. The recent proliferation of a discourse on happiness is suggestive.  For an 
initial suggestion of the extent of such work in one area of academic thought, the 
social sciences, see Peter Henry Huang, Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, 6 ANNU. 
REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 405, 406–07 (2010). 
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subjects for discussion: the hope that the cultural form of law affords 
Americans in light of where society is today and, correspondingly, the 
role that lawyers can play in light of that promise.  The remaining two 
Parts of this Essay address these matters. 
II.  THE HOPE OF THE CULTURAL FORM OF LAW FOR AMERICA 
TODAY 
In parallel with Part I, the discussion of this subject begins with an 
explication of the cultural form of law.  The first step in 
comprehending what promise law can afford Americans is similarly 
understanding what the way of life looks like and, in light of the 
purposes of this Part, what principal features of well-being it 
possesses that oppose the central pathologies of the economic way of 
life.  Only if we have a picture of what it means to experience the 
world “legally,” one that reveals the way of life’s main attributes of 
psychological welfare, can we grasp the potential it holds for 
contemporary American society.  Not surprisingly, the explication 
focuses on four ideas and follows the form of that taken up with 
respect to the cultural form of economics, exploring law’s basic 
metaphysical and existential orientation, its conception of self and 
other, and the central elements of wellbeing that follow therefrom. 
Turning to the explication, the cultural form of law begins with the 
idea of the sovereignty of the People.  For the legal way of life, the 
People reign.  The People possess a transcendental character and 
stand as a sort of supreme authority over the world.34  The universe 
begins with the People, who ultimately order things.  For the legal 
mode of being, the People govern, and in doing so, provide stability 
and guidance to the human interaction. 
In exercising its sovereignty, the People “ordain and establish” a 
Constitution that puts in place “rules of law,” which include a 
mechanism for generating additional rules of law.  The People’s 
governance occurs in and through this Constitution, applying the 
rules of law.  The sovereign character of the People, coupled with this 
specific character of its governance, points to the second idea that lies 
at the heart of the cultural form of law, one that stands as a corollary 
to the People’s existential preeminence.  For the legal mode of being, 
the sovereign People’s orientation toward the application of rules of 
 
 34. Cf. PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 27 (1997) (“Individuals exist; communities may exist.  
But ‘the people’ occupy a time and space of sovereignty that is not a place into which 
any individual can enter.”). 
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law means that rules of law have ontological integrity.  They exist in 
and of themselves and have their own essence.  For the legal way of 
life, they are “things-in-themselves.”35 
In a world in which the People reign and rules of law are 
correspondingly reified, we should expect an understanding of self 
and other to be constructed in a manner that aligns with these initial 
dispositions.  In the cultural form of law, they are.  The concepts of 
self and other resident in the legal way of life reflect its People and 
rules of law-centered orientation.  Not surprisingly, these concepts 
are also basic to the cultural form of law.  They represent the third 
and fourth foundational ideas. 
With respect to the understanding of the self, for the legal mode of 
living, the individual is an object of rules of law.  That is, the 
individual is a person to whom rules of law apply.  More precisely, he 
or she is a person to whom rules of law definitively apply.  For the 
legal way of life, there is no possibility that rules of law do not attach 
to the individual—that he or she is “above” rules of law.  Without 
question, he or she is subject to their jurisdiction.36 
Reciprocally, if the individual is a person to whom rules of law 
apply, then he or she will apprehend the other in terms of his or her 
legally regulated behavior.  This fact suggests the understanding of 
the other to which the legal mode of living adheres.  For the legal way 
of life, the other is a person, non-human sentient being, or thing with 
whom or with which one interacts in accordance with rules of law.  
All are persons, non-human sentient beings, or things with whom or 
with which one relates legally. 
The understanding of the cultural form of law that emerges from 
the description of its organizing ideas is that of a way of life oriented 
around a popular sovereign and its rules of law and in which self and 
other are conceptualized in terms of an overarching rules-of-law 
basis.  With this picture of the cultural form of law in hand, we can 
reflect on its essential character and ask what it is that we see.  And 
against the backdrop of the analysis of the cultural form of 
economics, a critical feature of the cultural form of law reveals itself, 
one that suggests the presence of a certain harmony of being.  The 
legal mode of being maintains an understanding of self and other that 
has currency.  It sees self and other in a manner that is legitimate as a 
matter of reason.  As indicated, the legal manner of living approaches 
 
 35. Relatedly, they are not rules of men.  For a discussion of this characteristic of 
rules of law, see KAHN, supra note 6, at 21–23. 
 36. Id.  
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the self in norm-bound terms and the other in the vocabulary of 
norm-bound interaction.  Each of these conceptualizations is sensible.  
At his or her core, the self can be understood as a person subject to 
rules of law.  Equally, the other can be seen as that to whom or to 
which one relates in terms of such norms.  Self and other can appear 
in a variety of ways.  And, in the range of possible forms, each 
represents a viable alternative.  Accordingly, the legal way of life’s 
conception of self and other cannot be said to denote a mistake in 
thought. 
Two features of psychological well-being—attributes that stand 
opposed to the central pathologies of the economic way of life—
follow from this state of affairs.  Preliminarily, the adherence to the 
conception of self and other does not give rise to a fundamentally 
distorted understanding of the world as well as how to think about it 
and, correspondingly, allows for the possibility of an educated life.  In 
approaching self and other as, respectively, the object of the rules of 
law’s application and that to whom or to which one relates in terms of 
that regulated behavior, the cultural form of law builds a relationship 
to reality that is, at its heart, reasonable.  It constructs a sense of the 
world that has lucidity, one that in turn does not inhibit the 
individual’s ability to engage in productive reflection on that which 
surrounds him or her.  He or she does not lack an elementary 
comprehension of things or the tools by which to usefully meditate on 
them.  And this condition allows for a life that at least may be 
schooled. 
More deeply, the adherence to the understanding of self and other 
acknowledges the substantive character of each and, correspondingly, 
allows for a life with meaningful relations.  In approaching self and 
other as, again, the object of the rules of law’s application and that to 
whom or to which one relates in terms of that regulated behavior, the 
cultural form of law comprehends each in primary terms—that is, in 
terms that acknowledge the substantive integrity of each.  Self and 
other exist as self and other.  Because self and other are affirmed in 
this manner, the legal mode of being allows for a life with meaningful 
relations.  With the cultural form of law, the individual has an 
essence, one that he or she can move beyond in connection with the 
other.37 
To be clear, the various relationships of connection that the 
individual might establish—for example, with particular individuals or 
 
 37. See supra note 18.  
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non-human sentient beings—are not constructed entirely on their 
own terms.  The individual does not build the relationship of 
connection in a purely “free space.”  Rather, consistent with the legal 
understanding of the self, the rules of law to which he or she is subject 
define a background context against which he or she takes it up.  
They frame the manner in which he or she engages the other.  This 
state of affairs has consequences for the substantive character of the 
relationship constructed.  Specifically, in setting the border within 
which the individual interacts with the other, the rules of law place 
limits on the set of behavioral possibilities for the individual and, 
correspondingly, the range of meanings he or she can experience.  
They constrain the types of action in which the individual can engage 
and, thereby, the kinds of connections he or she can make.  Because 
rules of law operate in this restrictive manner, the conclusion that the 
legal mode of being allows for an existence with meaningful relations 
requires qualification.  The legal mode of being does so, but within 
the limits of its own terms.  The relevance, or practical effect, of such 
limits depends on the particular individual involved and the quality of 
the connection he or she desires.38 
The first step in comprehending what promise the cultural form of 
law can afford Americans is its explication.39  Once again in parallel to 
Part I, the next step is an account of its actual, which in this context is 
to say its historical, manifestation.  It is the historical expression of 
the cultural form of law in political space that affords a first hand 
picture of its practice and thus that which ultimately allows us to see 
its promise.  To what extent, then, have Americans taken up the 
 
 38. The manifestation of such limits is the manifestation of law’s violence.  The 
classic discussion of law’s violence is Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 
Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
 39. The above explication of the cultural form of law, and particularly its features 
of well-being, is incomplete.  In addition to the two features identified, a third feature 
of well-being is resident in the cultural form of law.  That attribute inheres in the 
taking up of the legal way of life itself.  Specifically, the practice of the legal way of 
life is the practice of living as a member of a community under the sovereign 
governance of the People and its normative dictates—living “under the rule of law.”  
It is of participating in a specific type of social governance, one that is defined by 
popular governance.  In turn, it is of taking part in a collective project, one that 
extends across time and across generations and, correspondingly, provides a history 
and an identity to the self.  In sum, it is the practice of political community, with all of 
the richness that other practices of political community provide, at least in their 
modern form. See, e.g., KAHN, supra note 34.  Because this Essay focuses on the 
more immediate social consequences associated with taking up the legal way of life, it 
necessarily places this attribute to the side of its discourse.  In doing so, the intention 
is not to minimize the importance of this feature of well-being.  
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cultural form of law in the past?  Correspondingly, to what degree 
have its principal features of well-being realized themselves? 
Historically, Americans have extensively embraced the cultural 
form of law.  Indeed, Americans have placed it at the center of their 
political lives.  The legal mode of being has been the principal, albeit 
not the only, form of American engagement of the political order.40  
In turn, its main attributes of psychological welfare have traditionally 
manifested themselves throughout that order.  A brief description of 
the historical landscape of American political life provides a general 
sense of the comprehensiveness of the past engagement.  In parallel, a 
short account of the associated expression of well-being provides a 
basic appreciation of the complete extent to which the cultural form’s 
principal healthy features have presented themselves. 
To begin, as indicated, Americans have traditionally brought the 
legal mode of being to bear on their political life.  That is, as a general 
historical matter, Americans have understood the People—to whose 
rules of law they conform their behavior in relation to the world that 
surrounds them—to govern the political order.  The Constitution, 
along with follow-on legislation, regulations, and judicial decisions, 
have determined the standards for behavior in the earlier referenced 
areas of political life—the approach to nature,41 other individuals,42 
the constituent elements of the body,43 social institutions,44 and the 
community generally.45  Similarly, they have established the criteria of 
behavior in the various other aspects of Americans’ politics—for 
example, the approach to religious affairs,46 foreign affairs,47 covert 
 
 40. See generally, KAHN, supra note 34.   
 41. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7449 (2006) (codifying the Clean Air Act of 1970 
and amendments). 
 42. For an introduction to the American constitutional doctrine of privacy, see 
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 555–91, 600–
14 (15th ed. 2004).  Parenthetically, it is a mistake to think that privacy is not an 
inherently political concept.  Indeed, the construction of privacy is “a contestable 
political move.” KAHN, supra note 34, at 83. 
 43. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–274g (2006).  For an introduction to the American 
constitutional jurisprudence of the related subject “the right to die,” see SULLIVAN & 
GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 614–29. 
 44. See, e.g., SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 1461–1502 (describing the 
American constitutional jurisprudence of freedom of the press). 
 45. E.g., 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451–473 (2006). 
 46. For an introduction to the jurisprudence of the Constitution’s religion clauses, 
see SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 1504–1606. 
 47. For an introduction to the American constitutional jurisprudence concerning 
foreign affairs, see SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 354–60. 
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affairs,48 the family,49 the uses of the body,50 and business relations.51  
Regardless of the political space at which one might look, this same 
situation obtains.  The People’s rules of law have dictated 
requirements of conduct in that area of political life.  Popular rule has 
reigned in that political space. 
Corresponding to the historical American embrace of the cultural 
form of law throughout their political life has been the coincident 
manifestation of its central features of well-being.  With respect to the 
initial feature of well-being—a lucid disposition toward that which 
surrounds the individual and the possibility for an educated existence 
it effects—with the comprehensive engagement, the accompanying 
adoption of the legal understanding of self and other has translated, 
throughout the political order, to a reasonable understanding about 
the world as well as of how to think about it and accordingly to an 
existence pointing in the direction of an educated life (which is not to 
say that such a life has been realized).  As the earlier analysis would 
lead one to expect, fairly considered, the various particular 
conceptualizations that arise—for example, the self qua object of 
rules of law’s regulation with respect to nature, other individuals, the 
constituent elements of the body, etc. and the associated other as the 
object of interaction—are compelling.  Self and other can be 
understood as each of these things.  To see them in these ways has 
been to embrace a legitimate thought, one that expresses a sensible 
understanding about the nature of things, does not inhibit the ability 
to productively reflect about the world and maintains the path of a 
learned life. 
With respect to the deeper feature of well-being—the 
acknowledgement of the substantive character of self and other and, 
consequently, the allowance for a life with meaningful relations—the 
adoption of the legal mode of being’s understanding of self and 
other—again, for example, the self qua object of rules of law’s 
 
 48. E.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 401–442a (2006).  For related executive orders, see, e.g., 
Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401 
(2006).  
 49. For an introduction to the American constitutional jurisprudence concerning 
family relationships, see SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 591–600.  
Additionally, a dramatic example of law’s reach into the family is the criminal law’s 
traditional unwillingness to acknowledge a husband’s rape of his wife. See, e.g, 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1962) (establishing the precondition for rape as “[a] 
male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife”).  
 50. See supra note 42.  
 51. The range of laws structuring business relations is wide.  For an introductory 
discussion, see ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 30–32 (1986). 
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regulation with respect to nature, other individuals, the constituent 
elements of the body, etc. and the associated other as the object of 
interaction—has been to recognize self and other qua self and other 
and, thus, to make possible a life with meaningful relations 
throughout political space.52  Stated directly, to see self and other in 
these fashions—to have embraced this legitimate thought—has been 
to affirm the integrity of each and, accordingly, to allow one to move 
beyond the self and connect with the other. 
Importantly, in manifesting themselves, these central features of 
well-being have had concrete social effects.  As with the main 
pathologies of the soul of the economic way of life, incident to their 
realization have been discrete effects on the daily life of society.  
Practicing in the direction of an educated life and practicing one that 
allows for meaningful relations with the other has inevitably impacted 
the basic functioning of the political order, an impact worth noting to 
fully capture the social condition to which the American engagement 
of the cultural form of law has given rise and, thus, the hope that the 
legal mode of being affords Americans.  Among other things, 
American understanding about the world has given rise to at least 
some degree of basic health within the political order.  For example, it 
has led to environmental protection,53 compassionate treatment of 
animals,54 interpersonal commitment,55 high-quality social 
institutions,56 and a strong sense of community,57 at least at times.  
Equally, it has led to a more sympathetic structuring of business 
relations, at least during some periods in American history.  
Meanwhile, the ability to lead a life in connection with the other has 
resulted at times in a practice of love and, correspondingly, a more 
fulfilled citizenry.58 
Of course, basic political life in America has not been without its 
problems and imperfections.  Indeed, it is doubtful that it could 
 
 52. The notion of connecting with the other throughout political space requires 
the qualification of “where possible.”  As noted supra, there is a limit on the types of 
others with whom or which we can connect (but they are not limited to human or 
even sentient beings). See supra note 18. 
 53. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7449 (2006) (codifying the Clean Air Act of 1970 and 
amendments). 
 54. Among other examples, the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Animals (ASPCA) was founded in 1866.  Information on the ASPCA is available 
at http://www.aspca.org/.  
 55. See, e.g., TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION 231–68 (1998). 
 56. See, e.g., FENTON, supra note 24, at 52–53, 54–55, 58. 
 57. See BROKAW, supra note 55. 
 58. See id. 
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survive a moral critique.59  The historical treatment of blacks and 
women, among other groups, immediately suggests just some of the 
reasons for questioning this possibility.  Nonetheless, the realization 
of these central features of well-being has produced an overall 
positive concrete condition, at least at times.  The history in this 
regard is not one of a consistently negative circumstance. 
The two steps taken provide an understanding of the hope that the 
cultural form of law affords Americans.  With this understanding—
that the cultural form of law offers the hope of an alternative to the 
economic mode of being, one that effects a more positive social 
circumstance—a conclusion about the quality of this promise follows.  
It is not an unhealthy one, and is at least a step on the path of a sound 
social existence. 
III.  THE ROLE FOR THE LAWYER IN AMERICA TODAY 
In light of the promise that the cultural form of law affords 
Americans, the understanding of the role of the lawyer in America 
today is straightforward.  His or her function is to help realize the 
hope of the cultural form of law, and to push against the 
manifestation of the cultural form of economics and its negative 
consequences for society.  That is, he or she is to act to express the 
cultural form of law and the social situation to which it gives rise, and 
to resist the expression of the economic universe of understanding 
and the social order it effects.  As the representative figure of the 
cultural form of law, his or her professional responsibility naturally 
takes this form.60 
This role of the lawyer has a variety of general and specific 
obligations associated with it and, unsurprisingly, their account lies 
beyond the bounds of this Essay.  It has also been taken up 
elsewhere, at least to some significant extent.61  One question about 
the obligations of the lawyer, however, features prominently in 
 
 59. On the relationship of political life to moral life, see Rakesh K. Anand, Legal 
Ethics, Jurisprudence, and the Cultural Study of the Lawyer, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 737, 
767–72 (2008) [hereinafter Anand, Legal Ethics] and Rakesh K. Anand, Advancing 
the Cultural Study of the Lawyer: Developing Three Philosophical Claims and 
Introducing a New Comparative Normative Inquiry, 3 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 107, 131–
35 (2010) [hereinafter Anand, Advancing]. 
 60. For an account of the relationship between law, lawyer identity, and lawyer 
professional responsibility, see Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 59.   
 61. See Anand, Advancing, supra note 59, at 131–35; Anand, Legal Ethics, supra 
note 59, at 767–72; Rakesh K. Anand, The Role of the Lawyer in the American 
Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1611 (2009). 
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discussions about the practice of law today, a question that also 
directly intersects with this Essay’s discussion about the growing 
influence of the economic way of life and how we should think about 
law and lawyers as a result of this circumstance.  Accordingly, a brief 
commentary on the associated subject matter is appropriate.  The 
question concerns the organization of the profession and, more 
specifically, the rearrangement of the profession in light of the 
present state of the national economy.  How is the profession to 
structure itself given the extant environment and the realities 
associated with it? 
Obviously, the subject matter is complex and there is much to say 
about it.  Against the backdrop of this understanding of the role of 
the lawyer, however, one point requires highlighting.  The inherent 
nature of the role of the lawyer speaks directly to this query.  That is, 
it answers the question presented, at least in the first instance.  
Specifically, the responsibility to help realize the promise of the 
cultural form of law signifies that a boundary exists within which any 
course of action is to be pursued.  In confronting the challenges of the 
prevailing economic conditions in the United States, the legal 
profession must maintain a commitment to the legal way of life and 
the manner in which it organizes and understands experience.  It must 
remain “legally” oriented and address the economic circumstances of 
the country from within this perspective. 
Importantly, this boundary to conduct permits a wide array of 
action.  To the extent that various parts of the profession need to 
restructure themselves, a broad range of possibilities is available to 
legal professionals.  Certainly, many of the commonly discussed paths 
fit within the requisite parameter of conduct, at least on their own 
terms.  For example, private law firms are free to provide more 
technologically sophisticated services, as well as to expand the array 
of legal services they provide and the set of individuals to whom they 
provide those services.  Equally, law schools may adopt curricular and 
classroom changes that focus on foundational skills instruction (for 
example, how to read a case, how to read a statute, how to think 
conceptually, how to write quality legal prose, and understanding the 
importance of listening) or on more “practice-ready” skills.62 
 
 62. In my opinion, a focus on “practice-ready” skills is problematic.  It is an error 
to believe that law schools could create a competent practitioner in three years.  
Except for the most rudimentary matters, the practice of law is far too complex to 
master in such a short period of time.  The knowledge, technical ability, judgment, 
and cultural competence required to practice successfully, simply at a basic level, 
takes several years post-graduation to acquire.  
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While the boundary to conduct is not constraining in any overly 
burdensome sense, it does place a significant limitation on the 
behavior of the profession.  Specifically, any reorganization of any 
part of the profession must not arise from a commitment to the 
pursuit of profit per se.  It must not be rooted in a dedication to 
profit-maximization.  The framework within which the profession is 
to behave precludes this type of action because it contradicts the 
demand on the lawyer to remain committed to the legal way of life.  
To orient oneself around profit-maximization is to organize oneself 
“economically.”  It is to direct oneself toward the sovereignty of the 
market and to take up an interest-based mode of being.  It is, then, to 
serve the wrong master and embrace the incorrect manner of living.  
It is to fail to orient oneself toward the sovereign People and engage 
its rules of law-based mode of being. 
Precisely because the boundary to conduct places this limitation on 
profit-maximizing behavior, certain proposals for the reform of the 
legal profession to which some are now giving voice appear to be 
problematic.  At present, there is a call from some to understand and 
organize the legal profession in a manner that is more aligned with its 
economic aspects.  For example, individuals promote the approach to 
private law firms as commercial entities and, correspondingly, the 
opening up of such firms to outside investment.63  Equally, individuals 
argue for law schools to understand themselves in more business-
oriented terms64 and in turn to adopt curriculums that will produce 
graduates that are more market-ready.65  By all appearances, in 
making these proposals, these individuals root themselves in a 
psychology that accepts profit-maximization as the first principle of 
organizational behavior.  That is, the authors of these propositions 
seemingly begin from an embrace of the pursuit of profits as the axis 
of orientation around which to think about the structure of the legal 
profession.  In doing so, these voices for reform necessarily reject the 
 
 63. See Larry E. Ribstein, Want to Own a Law Firm?, AMERICAN (May 30, 2007), 
http://www.american.com/archive/2007/may-0507/want-to-own-a-law-firm; see also 
Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749 (2010). 
 64. See, e.g., William Henderson, The Hard Business Problems Facing U.S. Law 
Faculty, NAT’L L.J.’S L. SCH. REV. (Oct. 31, 2011), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/ 
lawschoolreview/2011/10/the-hard-business-problems-facing-us-law-faculty.html.  
 65. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss & William D. Henderson, The New Math of 
Legal Education, ABA YOUNG LAWS. DIVISION (July 2008), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/young_lawyer_home/young_lawyer_archive
/yld_tyl_july08_morriss.html; Karen Sloan, What Is Law School For, Anyway?, 
NAT’L L.J., Jan. 16, 2012, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/ 
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202538352545. 
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boundary to conduct within which the legal profession can 
legitimately respond to the extant economic situation.  Accordingly, 
their proposals are not viable paths of change for the legal profession. 
Instinctively, at least some of these individuals may question the 
“practicality” of this preclusion on profit-maximizing behavior, 
presumably asserting that such a prohibition on lawyer behavior is 
not realizable in today’s economic times.  It is hardly clear that such 
an argument is tenable, both in the direction of intelligibility and 
functionality.  On the one hand, the history of the legal profession is 
not one of fundamental commercialization.  The non-private firm 
elements of the profession have not historically been run as 
businesses.  Nor have private firms always understood themselves in 
this manner, at least not wholly.66  On the other hand, to the extent 
that the legal profession has increasingly aligned itself along 
commercial lines, a concrete path for reversing this trend appears 
available.  A not insignificant number of economists today predict 
that in the medium to long term, inflation will arise in the United 
States.  To the extent that this situation occurs, the profession can 
affirmatively “not inflate”—or at least inflate at a rate that is 
appreciably less than that which becomes resident in society as a 
whole. 
Like most in the United States, the legal profession is subject to the 
economic realities of today.  In reacting to them, the legal profession 
must remain grounded, and stay tied to the role it is to play in 
American political life.  The cultural form of law offers the hope of a 
different mode of being than the economic, one that affords a more 
positive social condition.  The role of the lawyer is to help realize that 
prospect. 
CONCLUSION 
Today, the social order in America is neither in a healthy state nor 
heading in a positive direction.  Law represents a medium in and 
through which to help reverse this state of affairs.  Correspondingly, 
lawyers have a role to play in realizing that change of circumstance.  
Understanding the situation in which one finds oneself is a useful, and 
arguably necessary, condition for responsible action.  From this 
perspective, awareness of each of the above facts is the starting point 
 
 66. See, e.g., SOL M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED 
PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994). 
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for improving the American social condition.  Next, action is 
required. 
 
